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Abstract 
Starting with a preliminary ev#zluation 
of Canadian human rights pracbces, the 
author critically traces the devt$opmen t 
of international human rights &Japan. 
While the country has been afflicted fa- 
vourably by the newly-emergifig inter- 
national human rights regime4 judicial 
reluctance to acknowledge the &levance 
of human dignity leads theau thdr to con- 
clude that there is still a long z4ay to go 
in achieving the desired situadion. The 
article ends with a call for thea4eptance 
of treaty-based individual peti)ion pro- 
cedures, which in his view m y  efec- 
tively induce the judicia y to ofben up to 
the universal norms for the prodection of 
human rights. I 
Amorcant son expose'par unehialuation 
priliminaire des pratiques canbdiennes 
en matitre de droits humains,"l'auteur 
proctde ensuite d un trace' critique du 
de'veloppement des droits fiumains 
intemationaux au Japon. Alots que ce 
pays a subit les fleets favorab&s du re'- 
gime international des droits h h i n s  de 
re'cen te hergence, on observe t#z certain 
nombrederisistances juridiqu8d recon- 
naitre la pertinence de la dipite' hu- 
maine. Ceci amhe l'auteur dd  prisent 
articled conclurequ'il yaenco@un long 
chemin d parcouriravan t d'a ttdndre une 
situation acceptable duns CI? dossier. 
L'article se conclut sur une inditation d 
l'acceptation des procddures dbppel in- 
dividuelles fonde'es sur deS traite's 
internationaux. Selon l'auteui une telle 
invitation devrait encourager i e secteur 
juridiqued s'ouvrir aux norm$ univer- 
selles en matihedeprotection dies droits 
humains. 
Kokki Abe, isa ~is i t in~~esearcherat  &centrefor 
Refugee Studies, York University, &dProfessor 
of Law, Kanagawa University, Yokohama, 
Japan. 
Kohki Abe 
Some Reflections on Canadian 
Practice 
I am inclined to associate the phrase 
"international human rights" with 
Canada. If you ask me to name a few 
people who encouraged me to go into 
the field of international human 
rights, without hesitation I would 
name the late Canadian Justice Walter 
Tarnopolsky first. Imet himin 1984 at a 
summer session organized by the Inter- 
national Institute of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg, France. It was virtually the 
first time that Ihadeverbeenexposed to 
international human rights issues pre- 
sented in such a systematic manner. At 
that time, there was literally no ac- 
knowledgment of that particular field of 
law in the legal profession in Japan. 
In the middle of the session, the 
institute hosted a party to welcome 
guest speakers and participants. Dur- 
ing the party, I approached Justice 
Tarnopolsky and thanked him for a 
marvellous deliberation on the human 
rights covenants. By word of praise, I 
said to him, "How I wish we could have 
a judge like you in my country who is so 
versed in international human rights." 
Apparently pleased, he replied: "Well, 
why don't you encourage national 
judges by writing and getting involved 
in litigations?" I remember saying very 
naively, "Yes, I will." 
It has been close to 15 years since that 
encounter. I donot think I have betrayed 
my promise. Ihave actually written, and 
got involved, in a number of human 
rights litigations. The promise, how- 
ever, is only half-fulfilled. The other side 
of the pledge is yet to be made good. We 
have not yet succeeded in bringing up 
judges in our judiciary who may be 
qualified to fill the shoes of the late Jus- 
tice Tarnopolsky, an unfortunate testi- 
mony that international human rights 
stillhave along way to goinmy country. 
Having said that, I do not intend to 
overly "flatter" Canada. When I set foot 
on Canadian soil, somebody warned me 
that Canada is full of inconsistencies. I 
amnot in aposition to judge whether the 
word "inconsistency" best describes 
this country. Nevertheless, having 
spent the last few months in Toronto, I 
have come to recognize that yes, indeed, 
this country is loaded with inconsisten- 
cies, particularly in my major field of 
concern, international human rights. 
Let us look at the brighter side first. 
On the international level, Canada 
stands out foremost in setting and lead- 
ing important humanitarian agendas. 
Recent outstanding endeavours in- 
clude the adoption of such epoch-mak- 
ing documents as the Anti-Personnel 
Land Mine Treaty and the Statute of the 
InternationalCriminalCourt. Concern- 
ing international human rights, there 
are very few countries, if any, that can 
beat Canada in their commitment to cre- 
ate and develop an international hu- 
man rights regime. Canada has already 
ratified six core human rights treaties as 
well as the first Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Refugee 
Convention, the Genocide Convention, 
etc. What impressedmeisnot the ratifi- 
cation record per se, but the speed with 
which Canada proceeded to be bound 
by many of those documents. 
Canada has submitted many reports 
to the human rights treaty bodies. Con- 
trary to the widespread practice, as of 
February 1998, only three Canadian re- 
ports were overdue. To the pleasure of 
the international human rights comrnu- 
nity, moreover, when the initial report 
was reviewed by the Human Rights 
Committee in March 1980, the Cana- 
dian representative told the Committee 
that 
in his country's opinion, the Commit- 
tee's questions and comments, 
whether in the context of the Cov- 
enant or of its Optional Protocol, 
could have a significant impact and 
help to increase the understanding of 
i 
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It seems to me that Canada has been 
duly faced 9ith the challenges posed by 
the first Op@onal Protocol to the ICCPR 
as well. Ihdividual petitions filed 
against the Canadian government have 
accounted tor a substantial percentage 
of the Human Rights Committee's 
caseload. Cbnly Jamaica has had more 
petitions Wed against it. It is by no 
means an indication that Canada's 
human r ih ts  record is far below the 
internatiorial standard. On the con- 
trary, it map signify that the Canadian 
public has dhigher level of awareness of 
the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol 
than most &her countries. Most of the 
cases subwitted to the Committee have 
been declaed inadmissible or discon- 
tinued. Cahada was found in violation 
of the relevant articles of the ICCPR in 
seven caseb. Significantly, Canada re- 
acted to sQme of those non-binding 
"views "of be~ornmitteeb~ amending 
domestic lqgislation. 
On the domestic front, in addition to 
the Irnmigation and Refugee Board's 
(IRB) hum@ rights and gender-sensi- 
tive asylm procedures, world's atten- 
tion has been attracted by the dynamic 
jurisprudence demonstrated by the Su- 
preme Coyrt. In the words of Maxwell 
Cohen an4 Anne Bayefsky (1983,265 
and 268), the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms of 1982 served as 
a "bridge" between municipal law and 
international law. The most prominent 
architect of that "bridge" has beennone 
other than the Supreme Court. In spite of 
built-in constitutional restrictions 
against the direct application of trea- 
ties, a significant number of human 
rights treaties have been passionately 
invoked-at least until recently--by the 
top court to reinforce its rulings. It is as 
if binding treaties were part of Cana- 
dian law. 
As is well known, one of the most 
active advocates and promoters of inter- 
national human rights in the judiciary 
was Chief Justice Brian Dickson, whose 
obituary caught my eye when I opened 
the morning paper on October 18 last 
year. As the title of a eulogy by Osgoode 
Hall Law School professor Allan 
Hutchinson (1998) properly indicates, 
Dickson was the "right choice at the 
right time" for international human 
rights law in Canada. Among many of 
his legacies is the "Dickson Doctrine" 
which finds clear expression in his dis- 
senting opinion in Re Public Service 
Employee Relations Act. The most rel- 
evant part reads: 
I believe that the Charter should 
generally be presumed to provide 
protection at least as great as that 
afforded by similar provisions in 
international human rights docu- 
ments which Canada has ratified. 
([I9871 lS.C.R.313,350). 
Under his influence, the Supreme 
Court, putting aside the prior "ambigu- 
ity test" applied to international trea- 
ties, vigorously explored new frontiers 
of international human rights norms 
whose activism found resonance in 
some like-minded lower courts includ- 
ingTamopolsky1s Ontario Court of Ap- 
peal. This "Canadian judicial activism 
toward international human rights" is 
something you rarely witness in my 
country, where the judiciary is truly 
adamant in rejecting the permeation of 
internationalhuman rights into its own 
"sphere of influence." 
However, there are some indelible 
blemishes or scandals which tarnish 
Canadian international human rights 
record. What instantly comes to mind is 
the flagrant disregard of the request 
from the Human Rights Committee for a 
stay of extradition to the United States 
where the death penalty was waiting for 
the author of the communication. 
Canada seems curiously insensitiie to 
deathpenalty issues. Ijustwant toknow 
why the champion of human rights that 
has already abolished capital punish- 
ment at peace-time, is yet to accede to-the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
aimed at abolishing the death penalty. 
In two extradition cases which finally 
went to the Human Rights Committee, 
even the Supreme Court showed insen- 
sitivity innot taking heed of interna- 
tional h & rights arguments against 
extraditing someone to a place where 
that persqn could face execution. 
Beyond the Supreme Court and a 
handful of other like-minded courts, a 
general judicial picture of international 
human ri$hts is very dim (see Schabas 
1996). Fey intellectual resources have 
been mobilized to acknowledge and 
develop international human rights 
standard$. My sense is that interna- 
tional law is not yet part of daily life in 
the Canadian judiciary in general. The 
"judicial ectivism" referred to above is 
not ubiquitous in the Canadian judicial 
scenery. 
~ ~ ~ a l b ~ l ~  scandalous on the do- 
mestic level is systematic negation of 
"the othel half " of international human 
rights: economic, social, and cultural 
rights. The statement that Chief Justice 
Antonio tamer addressed to the Inter- 
national Bar Association conference in 
Vancouver on September 14,1998, was 
quite in@cative of the local situation 
regarding that category of rights: "This 
clear statement, in an international in- 
strumenq [International Covenant on 
Economir, Social and Cultural Rights], 
is not m$tched by a correspondingly 
clear provision in our domestic law." 
This waq manifest confession by the 
highest lqgal authority that Canadian 
domestic law is not on par with interna- 
tional human rights standards. 
What 1 find shocking in this context 
is that the Canadian common ethics of 
sharing i b  increasingly imperilled by a 
sharp, wjdening gap between the rich 
and the poor. Not a single day passes by 
in Toronfo without visual evidence that 
this coqtry is taking a path to social 
crisis. A$ increasing number of home- 
less peo !el the grave level of child pov- 
erty, an 1 recent doubling in the use of 
food b w s ,  all happen in this affluent 
country& Importantly, they are not 
brought #bout by accident, nor are they 
an inevitpble outcome of economic glo- 
balizatioh gone wild. They are the result 
of delibe$ately executed policies. Every- 
one knoys that drastic welfarecuts and 
the withCrawal of both federal and pro- 
vincial d~thorities from funding new 
housing projects are behind the current 
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crisis. What people are not @ware of, 
however, is that these mequres are 
deemed to be a serious violadion of the 
International Covenant on Fkonomic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (I$ESCR) to 
which Canada has been a Statlk party for 
more than 20 years. Therdfore, for 
Canada, a commitment to whlfare and 
housing is definitely amatter Qbf interna- 
tional legal obligation, not adrematter 
of charity or economic policy. It is unfor- 
tunate that Canada has not rhsponded 
to concerns expressed by the; monitor- 
ing body of the ICESCR, whl/ch exam- 
ined the Canadian situations fivk years 
ago. It was almost a forgone cbnclusion 
that similar concerns were wc4 again 
formulated in stronger terlihs by the 
same body in December l998ij when the 
new report was reviewed (Ukuted Na- 
tions 1998a). 
Politics of Human Rights /n 
Post-War Japan 
In contrast to Canada, wherdlthere has 
been keen interest among pdicy-mak- 
ers in human rights as a politkally use- 
ful tool to unify the otherwis6 splitting 
nation, Japan felt almost no wed to in- 
corporate into its policy the igea of hu- 
man rights. In fact, it was n(bt human 
rights but a dream of economii develop- 
ment that actually united #te entire 
state. The unifying factor +as rein- 
forced effectively by two njyths: the 
myth of government impeccdbility and 
the myth of one ethnic nation. The 
former implies that the go+ernment 
never makes a mistake, whilei the latter 
implies that Japan is compos#d of only 
one ethnic group: Japanese. Both are 
none other than myths that diki not cor- 
respond to reality. Our govern#nents did 
make mountains of mistakp. There 
were, and are, significant nyimbers of 
non-Japanese (not in terms o$ legal na- 
tionality) living in Japan. Tliie largest 
ethnic minority in our countty are the 
Koreans. Japanese live wbth such 
indigenous peoples as A*us and 
Okinawans as well. All the& undeni- 
able facts were put aside to adhkcorner 
for political convenience. The ynd result 
was that people were led td unite as 
Japanese and follow the "im$eccable" 
instructions granted by ouq govern- 
I 
ment. Please let it be noted that when I 
say "government" in the context of Ja- 
pan, I donot meancabinet ministers and 
other politicians. By "government," I 
mean elite bureaucrats and the unbeat- 
ablebureaucratic institution. They have 
been the realpolicy-makers, and that is 
where all the political power is concen- 
trated. 
As aliving witness born andbrought 
up in Japan, I can say confidently that 
the predominant values controlling 
post-war Japanese society have been the 
"spirit of harmony" and "economic ef- 
ficiency." On innumerable occasions, I 
have heard people say that "harmony" 
is an indispensable part of Japanese 
culture and "efficiency "is our supreme 
value without which our tiny "islands- 
nation" would never survive in a com- 
petitive world. These views are held 
without persuasive grounds. Yet, for 
policy-makers of a country which was 
totally devastated and even bombed 
with weapons of ultimate destruction 
during the Second World War, it was 
not necessarily unreasonable to set eco- 
nomic development as the primary na- 
tional goal to be achieved. For that 
purpose, the policy-makers had to mo- 
bilize citizens as quickly and effectively 
as possible. It was in such a context that 
the value of "harmony" was repeatedly 
beatified and emphasized. I recall viv- 
idly that our school reports up to high 
school always carried a "degree of har- 
mony" measurement among a few 
check-list items to assess students' be- 
haviour, although how I scored has now 
slipped out of my memory. 
The words "harmony "and "effi- 
ciency" may sound agreeable. Yet when 
they are promoted (sometimes as cul- 
ture) from above, you cannot take them 
at face value. The problem was that they, 
indeed, served to justdy the suppression 
of what should have been the supreme 
value of human beings: human dignity. 
Human dignity played second fiddle 
and always tookabackseat to economic 
development. Thus, human dignity, 
even human lives, were often sacrificed 
for the sake of state construction and 
economic prosperity. It was stressed 
that respect for human dignity was 
something luxurious that might be ob- 
tained only after the national goal was 
achieved. 
I should say that the conspicuous 
economic development of post-war Ja- 
pan, which garnered the world's eyes 
and was often called a "miracle," was 
for a long time plagued with consistent 
and reliably attested pattern of gross 
violations of human rights that fit the 
requirements of the confidential 1503 
procedures established by the UN hu- 
man rights mechanism. These human 
rights violations did not necessarily 
take a blood-tainted, high profile form 
like the mass killings in Cambodia or 
enforced disappearances in Argentina. 
They were "quiet." Yet, they were the 
inevitable result of systematic and wide- 
spread state policy. The whole state 
structure was mobilized to pursue state 
policy, therefore disregarding human 
rights. Themost advanced Constitution 
of Japan-enacted in 1946-which de- 
clared nobly the principle of human 
rights with as many as 30 articles allo- 
cated to embody the principle was virtu- 
ally paralyzed, not only by the hands of 
the government but by those of the judi- 
ciary as well. Any reasonable person 
would be surprised to learn that inmore 
than 95 percent of administrative litiga- 
tions filed against the government, citi- 
zen-plaintiffs have lost their cases. 
There is no way to win against the gov- 
ernment. It is no exaggeration to say that 
the judiciary protected the interests of 
the ruling elites, not those of citizens. 
What made things worse was the 
international political context of the 
Cold War, during which any serious 
criticism of the government was re- 
garded as anti-governmental, thus pro- 
communist. That particular political 
atmosphere worked enormously 
against human rights advocates. After 
all, in the eyes of the government and, to 
a great extent, in the eyes of the general 
public, there were no non-governmen- 
tal organizations (NGOs) in Japan. 
There were only either Anti-Govem- 
mental Organizations (AGOs) or the 
so-called Governmental NGOs 
(GONGOs). For "impeccable" policy- 
makers, critical NGOs were simply un- 
necessary. If you needed a citizens' 
movement, it should serve as an instru- 
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ment tohelp the government implement 
its policies. Only GONGOs could do 
this. Other NGOs were regarded as sim- 
ply fads or dangerous elements, ob- 
structing the smooth economic 
development. 
Article 34 of the century-old Civil 
Code provides that no civil organiza- 
tion may gain legal status (i.e., public 
interest corporation status) without a 
permit from a supervising bureaucratic 
agency. There maybe little wonder that 
only a few human rights NGOs have 
ever been granted legal status in Japan. 
Even Amnesty International Japan does 
not have legal status, thus it does not 
exist legally in our society. I could 
hardly believe my ears when I heard an 
official of the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs-the ministry that would be the 
supervising agency--once say, "as long 
as themandate of Amnesty includes the 
abolition of capital punishment it is 
difficult to give legal status. No move- 
ment against capital punishment may 
be officially acknowledged, since it is 
not in conformity with our Penal Code 
legislating capital punishment." The 
treatment of human rights NGOs is in 
stark contrast to that of the uncountable 
number of GONGOs, whichenjoy auto- 
matic legal status and tax receipts from 
donations. 
In retrospect, the entire citizenry was 
literally taken hostage for economic de- 
velopment. Women were given a fixed 
role of taking care of household affairs 
in addition to giving birth and rearing 
children. Manifest discrimination pre- 
dominated workplaces in employment, 
wage, promotion and retirement poli- 
cies. There was no institutional support 
for female workers to keep on working 
once they got married and had children, 
which helped sustain "indirect dis- 
crimination." Gender discrimination 
inculcated at school and in society col- 
luded with the sheer lack of institu- 
tional support toeffectively discourage 
women from remaining in the public 
domain. That women remained home 
was considered sine qua non for men to 
work around the clock as "company 
warriors." Equality clauses of the Con- 
stitution were interpreted to allow for 
different treatment between men and 
women in accordance with their "natu- 
ral peculiarities." Constitutional pro- 
tection and the criminal code rarely 
entered domestic spheres and rein- 
forced the unequal power balance be- 
tween the two sexes. 
Children were treated as objects or 
the property of parents, not bearers of 
human rights. At school the "spirit of 
harmony" was indoctrinated through 
pseudo-militaristic methods, including 
occasional outdoor group marches. We 
werenot taught the value of human dig- 
nity, nor the importance of individual 
liberty, but were encouraged to sacrifice 
ourselves for the sake of the group to 
which we belong, tobecome loyal work- 
ers for companies that were the driving 
force of economic development. Do not 
be critical of authority, do not ask ques- 
tions. Be compliant. That was the basic 
message given to the would-be labour 
work force at school. The mentally and 
physically challenged were segregated 
institutionally from the efficiency-ori- 
entedschoolandsociety. They were out 
of sight, therefore out of mind. 
Two of the most "invisible" minori- 
ties in Japan are resident Koreans and 
indigenous Ainu. Under the prevailing 
circumstances, these "heterogeneous" 
elements turned easily into targets of 
elimination simply because they were 
alleged to disturb harmony and inhibit 
smooth economic development. After 
the Korean Peninsula was liberated 
from Japan's occupation in 1945, a large 
number of Koreans went back to their 
homeland. For some reason, however, a 
significant number of Koreans re- 
mained. They would shape the greatest 
majority of the alien population in post- 
war Japan. The basic policy of our 
government was to control and eject 
them. The Immigration Control Order 
Act and the Alien Registration Act, both 
introduced in the immediate pos&war 
period, were the two legislative instru- 
ments created to justify this policy. Un- 
der these laws, aliens (namely Korean 
residents) were forced, with harsh 
criminal sanctions, to carry alien regis- 
tration cards at all times. They had to 
renew their registration at certain inter- 
vals by being fingerprinted, a practice 
imposed otherwise only on criminals. 
Renewal as not within their rights but 
was at a dministrative discretion. 
Equally important, no social welfare 
was give* to aliens with the under- 
standing&at they werenot members of 
our societjr. Governmental inaction was 
supported by constitutional arguments 
that social security should be guaran- 
teed to aliens by countries of their na- 
tional ori$in and not by the country of 
 residence^ In fact, it was only a mere 
theoretical possibility that resident Ko- 
reans could ever receive social security 
benefits @m their governments. Thus, 
they were left in legal limbo. 
The Aipu used to live mainly in the 
northern part of Japan, which is now 
called HOkkaido, a territory annexed 
forcibly tqward the end of the 19th cen- 
tury by thethen Japanese government. 
The Aina's distinct culture and tradi- 
tion wer4 regarded as "uncivilized," 
hence strong institutional pressure was 
exercisedito "civilize "them. It was more 
than a process of assimilation. To use a 
more contemporary term, it was aproc- 
ess of ethmcide and culturcide that we 
witnessed. 
The e n b  society viewed Korean and 
Ainu culWres as something to be eradi- 
cated or at least altered. It was no coin- 
cidence that a great majority of Korean 
studentsi fearing to be identified as 
such, did not disclose their real names 
in Japanelse schools. People of Ainu de- 
scent had to face the same unwelcome 
fate. Poliq-making elites did not induce 
the society to acknowledge multiracial 
realities. Japanese society had to be 
viewed a$ monoracial,not for thebenefit 
of individual citizens but for the 
maximjmtion of state and macro-eco- 
nomic advancement. 
Internafronnl Human Rights 
Openilbg Up in Japan 
Modem ,Japan was initiated with the 
Meiji Reltoration in 1868, which was a 
direct reaponse to the gun-boat diplo- 
macy of Western powers, particularly 
the Unitkd States. Commodore M. C. 
Perry cakne to Japan in armed black 
ships and forced secluded Japan to 
open up its seaports for foreignvessels. 
His arriyal was so threatening that it 
was desdtribed as the "Attack of Black 
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Ships." If you call that incidelht the first 
"Attack of Black Ships," t h h  the sec- 
ond "Attack of Black Ships" c@me in the 
latter half of the 1970s. This t$ne, boats 
were equipped not with gun4 but refu- 
gees. Indeed, the latter half otthe 1970s 
saw a massive flow of pedple from 
Indochina following the contkmporary 
political changeovers. East &ia was in 
turmoil. 
As a country which frantic@lly main- 
tained the fiction of being a "ane-ethnic 
nation," Japan was not ready /or willing 
to accept non-Japanese refukees from 
abroad. Even temporary lwding was 
rejected without a guaranteca of living 
expenses from UNHCR and ip guaran- 
tee of admission from a foreiglh country. 
It was odd, however, that as @e second 
largest economic power in the world, 
Japan remained so callous to refugee 
problems in her own region. Skong d i p  
lomatic pressure was exeqcised by 
Western allies, again particthlarly the 
United States, to open up Jape's soil to 
those in need of help. For gelbpolitical 
reasons cloaked in ahumanitwan coat, 
ruling elites finally made up @eir mind 
to accept Indochinese refugqs. It was 
proudly announced that in 1978, Japan 
accepted refugees fromVietniQm for re- 
settlement. Surely it was an epibch-mak- 
ing incident for a country *at never 
failed to show hostile attitudks to asy- 
lum-seekers. Yet, I must hasten to say 
that equally epoch-making was the total 
number of Vietnamese the cquntry ac- 
cepted in that year: it amoqted to as 
many as three! 
The dramatic policy changq to accept 
boat people from Indochina was a clear 
message that the Japanese golrernment 
would work hand-in-hand with its 
Western allies in solving refu ee prob- 
lems, which were feared to stread the 
"virus" of communism thmughout 
South East Asia. In that part$ular po- 
liticalcontext, Japan felt furthw pressed 
to join the Western-made Refulgee Con- 
ventionregime. It was in 1981itMyears 
after the adoption of the doamtent- 
that Japan acceded to the Cmvention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees to- 
gether with its 1967 Protocdl. It was 
originally intended to be a hollow dip- 
lomatic gesture. As a matter c$ fact, the 
Japanese government immediately and 
honestly announced that the country 
had no intention of opening wide its 
doors to asylum-seekers. Indochinese 
refugees, who numbered 10,000 in 1994 
when the special program to accept 
them was terminated, were dealt with a 
different policy framework. Simply put, 
they were permitted to stay in Japan due 
to administrative discretion but not 
given the rights-based Convention refu- 
gee status. Gaining Convention refugee 
status is as difficult as threading a nee- 
dle in the dark (The Forum on Refugee 
Studies 1996). Within the last five years, 
the Japanese government recognized 
only one asylum-seeker as a Conven- 
tion refugee each year as opposed to 
more than 10,000 a year by Canada. The 
year of 1998 was an exceptional one, 
with more than ten asylum-seekers be- 
ing granted refugee status in Japan. 
Nevertheless, accession to the Con- 
vention would turn out to have a sigrufi- 
cant impact on our society. For the first 
time in history, a procedure to deter- 
mine refugee status was set in motion. 
More importantly, in accordance with 
the obligations imposed by the Conven- 
tion, the government had to change rel- 
evant welfare regulations so as to 
eliminate the infamous nationality 
clauses. Resident Koreans were no 
longer left alone outside the national 
welfare scheme. They finally found 
their place in it, although still insuffi- 
cient. The fingerprinting requirement 
was later eradicated as inhuman and 
unnecessary. Prior and subsequent to 
the accession to the Refugee Conven- 
tion, Japan ratified two Human Rights 
Covenants and the Women's Conven- 
tion. The latter Convention brought 
forth Equal Opportunity legislation to 
eliminate rampant discrimination 
against women in employment, al- 
though this legislation was without 
teeth. Clearly, human rights treaty re- 
gimes ignited long-awaited institu- 
tional changes. 
More dynamic waves of influence, 
however, came from UN Human Rights 
machineries: the Commission on Hu- 
man Rights; and the Sub-commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
the Protection of Minorities. A young 
Japanese UNhuman rights officer, Yoh 
Kubota, helped "shrink" dramatically 
the distance between Geneva and To- 
kyo. Mr. Kubota, who died in 1989 while 
on a mission to newly-independent Na- 
mibia, encouraged Japanese human 
rights defenders to utilize UN human 
rights mechanisms such as the 1503 
procedure and the non-confidential 
1235 procedure to review human rights 
situations in any part of the world. His 
practical and strategic advice was wel- 
comed enthusiastically by activists and 
lawyers based in Japan, who, without 
exception, had been suffocated by stiff 
judicial inaction. The UN enjoys a spe- 
cial significant political status in Japan 
for historical reasons. Indeed, three pil- 
lars of our foreign policy have been 
alliance with the United States, co-op- 
eration with neighbouring Asian coun- 
tries, and contribution to the United 
Nations. NGOs in Japan instantly 
turned to human rights treaties and the 
UN mechanisms to carve out "legiti- 
macy" in their otherwise "anti-govern- 
mental" activities. 
The first result was obtained in the 
middle of the 1980s when the repre- 
sentative of Japan promised the Sub- 
commission that the government 
would revise legislation to segregate the 
mentally ill. A barrage of criticism had 
been waged against the Japanese gov- 
ernment in the Sub-Commission regard- 
ing that notorious law and ensuing 
inhuman practices. It can be recalled, 
incidentally, that when Japan made her 
debut in the UN Commission on Hu- 
man Rights in 1982, there was no par- 
ticularbureau in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in charge of international hu- 
man rights issues. Mme Sadako Ogata 
led the Japanese delegation in the 1982 
UN Commission. It was the first and last 
time that a non-diplomat led the delega- 
tion; it was the first and last time that a 
female representative led the delega- 
tion. Since the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs established the HumanRights and 
Refugee Division in the middle of the 
1980s, there has been no space for non- 
diplomat intervention in the human 
rights policy-making process. 
After a short hiatus, increasing and 
extensive attention began to be paid to 
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war-time reparation issues. Particu- 
larly significant was an issue of "com- 
fort womenn-former military sex 
slaves-a precursor to similar outra- 
geous practices witnessed in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda toward the 
end of this century. The original stance 
taken by our government was to keep 
aloof fromthe "comfort" womenissue. 
The government repeatedly said that 
"comfort" stations (i.e., brothels) were 
run by the private sector and had noth- 
ing to do with the government. When a 
document was unearthed establishing 
that the military was involved in the 
management of brothels, the govern- 
ment changed the official stance and ad- 
mitted its involvement. What the 
government didnot accept was legalre- 
sponsibility. The gist of the govern- 
ment's argument is that all issues 
arising from World War11 were resolved 
by peace treaties concluded with rel- 
evant countries. Moreover, Japan com- 
mitted no international wrongs to be 
legally blamed for (Govemment of Ja- 
pan 1996). 
The government now faces more than 
50 lawsuits from people who were 
physically, mentally, and sexually 
abused by the former Japanese Imperial 
Army. Since 1992, incessant pressure 
has been mobilized in the United Na- 
tions to encourage the Japanese govem- 
ment to assume legal responsibility. In 
1996, the UN Human Rights Commis- 
sion's Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women made public a special 
report on Japanese "comfort women" 
issues (United Nations 1996) after a 
similar fact-finding report was released 
by the International Commission on 
Jurists (International Commission of 
Jurists 1996). The UN Sub-Commis- 
sion's Special Rapporteur to study 
sexual slavery under armed conflicts 
reinforced, in her 1998 report, the con- 
clusions shownin prior reports (United 
Nations 1998b). They all express in one 
voice that what Japan did was against 
international law applicable at the time 
the inhumane acts were committed. In- 
voked are international treaties to sup- 
press white slavery, the International 
Labour Organization Convention on 
Forced Labour, customary interna- 
tional law to prohibit slavery, and regu- 
lations on land warfare. To the dismay 
of the victims, the Japanese government 
does not heed these internationally-ex- 
pressed views. Nevertheless, one 
should not overlook the effect of UN 
mechanisms, which give undeniable 
legitimacy to the activities pursued by 
citizens in Japan while gradually 
deligitimizing the government's argu- 
ment. Without the help of an interna- 
tional human rights mechanism, this 
process would not happen (Abe 1996). 
Similarly, voices of the indigenous Ainu 
are increasingly heard in the society 
with the help of the Sub-Commission 
and its pre-sessional Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations. 
Concurrent with war-time repara- 
tion issues, the treatment of aliens in 
detention is getting some attention. In- 
stitutional reform brought about by the 
Refugee Convention benefited, though 
insufficiently, "old-comer" aliens such 
as resident Koreans. It came, however, 
with the formation of a new hierarchy 
among aliens. While observing the so- 
cial advancement of "old-comers," 
"new-comer" aliens who landed in Ja- 
pan in the 1980s and 1990s seeking 
employment or protection are now in 
social and legal limbo. Found illegal 
under immigration regulations, they are 
inconstant fear of detention and depor- 
tation. What is really astonishing is the 
treatment of those aliens in detention 
centres. International human rights 
NGOs such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and the Penal 
Reform International all agree with 
Japanese human rights lawyers that the 
condition in immigration and criminal 
detention centres is truly inhuman and 
deviates from international human 
rights standards. There are volumes of 
documents corroborating the statement 
that systematic physical and mental 
abuses have taken place in detention 
centres (Amnesty International 1997). 
These allegations are gradually brought 
up in the UN mechanisms with a view 
to holding the authorities accountable 
for their misdeeds. 
The battlefields have been stretched 
from the UN bodies to human rights 
treaty bodies. The conclusion of human 
rights tre 'es has indeed given rise to 
institutio h changes. Yet they were just 
a tip of thd iceberg and definitely more 
reform shduld be undertaken to live up 
to treaty smdards. Unfortunately and 
absolutely incorrectly, when Japan fi- 
nally joinQd the Child Convention re- 
gime in 144, the government refused to 
revise any domestic laws, an attitude 
inadvertelhtly repeated the following 
year whe* the country acceded to the 
30-year-old Racial Convention. An ar- 
ray of dodiestic legislation should have 
been revibed to observe international 
obligatioas faithfully. With regard to 
the Child Convention, NGOs passion- 
ately conpiled three "alternative" re- 
ports and $ubmitted these tomembers of 
the treaty body prior to the review of the 
governmbt's report. They succeeded in 
drawing but appropriate conclusions 
from the Ctommittee on the Rights of the 
Child in Jme in 1998, in which the body 
firmly corrfirmed that children are bear- 
ers of human rights (United Nations 
1998~). f i e  committee recommended 
that the gbvernment devise and imple- 
ment a c4mprehensive action plan to 
tackle abiuses of children, including 
sexual exploitation, a step the govem- 
ment shduld and could have under- 
taken at the time of ratification. 
The review of state reports is anever- 
ending process. I can safely say that 
NGOs are gaining expertise as they re- 
view one report after another. It is in- 
creasing11 difficult to exclude NGOsr 
expertise from report-preparation proc- 
esses. The social status of NGOs has 
advanced incredibly in the meantime, 
which is tkstified most eloquently by the 
enactrneht in March 1998 of new legis- 
lation enduring legal status to any non- 
profit civil organization satisfying 
certainccjnditions. It overrides substan- 
tially the bbove mentioned, century-old 
feudalisdc provision of the Civil Code. 
Among @emostimportant factors con- 
tributin$lto the advancement of NGOsl 
social sthtus is the highly-organized 
and innovative activity they demon- 
strated the process leading up to the 
1993 Wdrld Conference on Human 
Rights +d similar international con- 
ferences. rShe collapse of the age-oldgov- 
ernmendl "impeccability" myth also 
I, 
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elevatedthe position of N G P .  Manifest 
failure ofthe rulingbureaucqits to over- 
come current economic crisis made their 
reputation plummet. The "one ethnic 
nation" myth has been already put be- 
hind by the institutional acbowledge- 
ment of different ethnic ggoups. We 
suddenly find ourselves wifi no more 
myths to reinforce the gave-ent-set 
national goal of economic deyelopment. 
 ore than anythmg, economi/c develop- 
ment itself can no more be pgrsued as a 
national goal in the preseqt financial 
situation. It is inevitable that the entire 
system constructed for that ,particular 
purpose is to be shaken. I4 poses an 
unprecedented political anq economic 
crisis in Japan; however, it is'ia wonder- 
ful opportunity to rebuild slate struc- 
ture so as to bemore human-gensitive or 
human-friendly and in line yith legiti- 
mate Constitutional and intkrnational 
human rights standards. 
Fortified Judiciary I 
Legitimated by internatioq~l human 
rights movements, once seglyegated so- 
cial groups are increasing* gaining 
ground in society, which e w s  in aca- 
demic institutions. Interna 'onal hu- P 
man rights law is gradlipally but 
steadfastly permeating into wiversity 
curricula as well. Accordithg to one 
study conducted by an academic soci- 
ety in 1994, a si@cantnumb(er of Japa- 
nese universities and college$-at least 
more than 30-already ha@ special 
courses on international h d a n  rights, 
a fact truly impressive giveq the abso- 
lute paucity of interest encmtered a 
decade ago. In 1988, interested academ- 
ics went as far as joining tqgether to 
establish the Japanese Assqiation of 
InternationalHumanRights Qaw. Opti- 
misticnotes, however, fade apay at the 
staunch gates of the judiciaq. Interna- 
tional human rights law is being in- 
creasingly acknowledged in Japan, yet 
it still has a long way to go qainly be- 
cause it has not gained firm rqognition 
in the conservative judiciary, 
The Constitution of Japaqprovides 
in Article 98 (2) that "Treaties amcluded 
by Japan and established l a p  of na- 
tions shall be faithfully obseryted." This 
provision is widely recogniz+ to mean 
that binding international law, either 
treaty or customary law, is part of Japa- 
nese law, an interpretation shared not 
only by most academics but by the gov- 
ernment and judiciary. International 
law is understood to be generally and 
automatically incorporated into the law 
of Japan. You donot need any process of 
transformation as is required, with re- 
gard to treaties, in Canada. The rank of 
international law in the domestic legal 
order is high enough to nullify any 
conflicting statutory provisions. Inter- 
national law is inferior only to the Con- 
stitution. This "warm" reception of 
international law by our Constitutional 
system was driven by deep repentance 
for the Second World War. The pream- 
ble of the Constitution goes: 
We, the Japanese people . . . resolved 
that never again shall we be visited 
with the horrors of war . . . do firmly 
establish this Constitution. We . . . 
desire peace for all time . . . and we 
have determined to preserve our 
security and existence, trusting in the 
justice and faith of the peace-loving 
peoples of the world. We desire to 
occupy an honoured place in an inter- 
national society striving for the pres- 
ervation of peace. 
The spirit of international cooperation, 
clearly expressed there, finds specific 
expression in Article 98(2) and has in- 
vited the high status of international 
law in Japan's legal system. 
International human rights litiga- 
tions started budding in the early 1980s, 
immediately after the entry into force of 
the Human Rights Covenants with re- 
spect to Japan. Notedhumanrightslaw- 
yer Kazuo Ito (1990) reported in the first 
issue of Kokusai Jinken (Human Rights 
International), an annual report pub- 
lished by the Japanese Association of 
International Human Rights Law, that 
among 57 international human rights 
litigations pursued in the 1980s, the 
ICCPR was invoked in favour of the 
plaintiffs in only one case. He confessed 
his impression correctly that the Japa- 
nese judiciary maintained a very nega- 
tive attitude toward international 
human rights, which was further am- 
plified by the sheer lackof knowledge of 
the law. Indeed, there is no lack of cases 
in which Article 26 of the ICCPR on 
equality was literally subsumed in a 
similar domestic equality clause with- 
out going into anymeaningfulinterpre- 
tation of the article. In an extradition 
case (1990), the Tokyo High Court irre- 
sponsibly "passed the buck" to the ex- 
ecutive branch by saying that the court 
is not a human rights court capable of 
examining a risk of human rights viola- 
tions that might take place after extradi- 
tion. In another widely publicized case 
(1994), the Tokyo District Court aban- 
doned itsbasic mandate of judicial scru- 
tiny of administrative decisions by 
incorrectly declaring that the determi- 
nation of refugeehood is ahighly politi- 
cal act outside judicial review. 
As an increasing number of litiga- 
tions got in the dock, the government 
advanced an argument to bifurcate in- 
ternational law between self-executing 
and non-self-executing norms, the 
former deemed tobe directly applicable 
in court and the latter not. This blunt 
American-born categorization, though 
widely supported by international law- 
yers, has no sound legal basis in our 
system. Just like Constitutional and 
statutory provisions, international 
norms that have domestic effects can be 
the basis of judicial judgments as long 
as the procedural requirements set by 
either the Code of Civil Procedures or 
the Code of Criminal Procedures are 
met. We have never categorized domes- 
tic laws by referring to self-executing or 
non-self-executing nature in our judi- 
cial process. International law as a law 
of Japan is entitled to receiveexactly the 
same judicial treatment as other 
domestic laws. Therefore, thejudiciary, 
faced with international law, should 
not be disturbed by ambiguous "self- 
executing" and "non-self-executing" 
distinctions. Unfortunately, however, 
American influence seems too strong to 
reject off-hand. 
One political function fulfilled by the 
bifurcation theory is that the interna- 
tional standard is blocked from getting 
into the domestic sphere. The elite bu- 
reaucrats of the Justice Ministry, sup- 
ported by mainstream conservative 
academics, cling to the idea that even 
the ICCPRcannot be invoked directly in 
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court. They argue that the ICCPR as a 
whole is designed to benon-selfexecut- 
ing as Article 2(2) requires State parties 
to take "legislative" measures. In fact, 
our Constitutional system does not nec- 
essarily require supplemental legisla- 
tive measures to implement the ICCPR. 
The government's exceptionally "de- 
fensive" argument to keep international 
human rights norms at bay is not ac- 
cepted by the judiciary. The ICCPR is 
judicially determined tobe self-execut- 
ing, though it has been rare that the 
document is directly applied or inter- 
preted in favour of the plaintiff. On the 
other hand, the ICESCR is repeatedly 
given the judicial cold shoulder. In 
1989, the Supreme Court denied a con- 
crete right arising fromthe ICESCRrely- 
ing on Article 2 (1) of the document, a 
view rejected by the subsequently for- 
mulated General Comment No. 3 of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
As we approach the end of the cen- 
tury, however, we were blessed with a 
few wonderful judicial outcomes (see 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
1997,368-98). The Tokyo High Court 
directly applied the ICCPR for the first 
time in 1993. The right to have the free 
assistance of an interpreter was recog- 
nizeddirectlybased on Article l4(f). The 
Code of Criminal Procedure does not 
guarantee such a right. In 1997, another 
High Court, confirming that any na- 
tional legislation is null and void when 
conflicting with international law, in- 
terpreted prison rules so as to conform 
with the ICCPR as id ormed by relevant 
UN standards and principles. In the 
same year, the Sapporo District Court 
recognized the Ainu as an indigenous 
people of Japan-the first time ever that 
an official organ did this-and applied 
Article 27 of the ICCPR in a case where 
the legality of the expropriation of Ainu 
sacred land was at issue. Behind that 
success were systematic endeavoursby 
bar associations to acquaint lawyers 
with international human rights stand- 
ards. With the Osaka Bar Association 
taking the lead, the Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations, a national umbrella 
organization for practising lawyers, 
hosted a variety of training programs 
and lectures, delivered by nationally 
and internationally renowned schol- 
ars. A model application form for inter- 
national human rights litigations is on 
hand and is widely circulated. 
In spite of some signs of change, the 
judiciary in general still remains overly 
cautious of international human rights 
law. After all, there are only a handful of 
cases in which international human 
rights law played a meaningful role in 
judgments and only in one or two cases 
was it directly applied, betraying the 
original Constitutional arrangement. 
The judiciary seems all the more cau- 
tious as it is currently inundated with 
highly complex war reparation suits. 
Here again, the government hangs on to 
the bifurcation theory. In the Siberian 
internment case, the government's in- 
credibly narrow criteria for the applica- 
tion of self-executing customary 
international rule was accepted by the 
Tokyo High Court, which stated in its 
1993 judgment that 
if a customary international rule is 
not minutely detailed as to the sub- 
stantive conditions on the creation, 
existence and termination of a right, 
the procedural conditions on the ex- 
ercise of the right, and moreover, the 
harmony of the rule with the existing 
various systems within the domestic 
sphere, and so forth, its domestic ap- 
plicability cannot but be denied. 
This was a formula to exclude interna- 
tional customary rules from Japanese 
courts effectively (Iwasawa 1993,362). 
Likewise, in the "comfort women" 
case and other related litigations in 
which I havebeen involved, the govern- 
ment argues that allissues arising from 
the last war have been legally resolved 
by peace treaties and that no interna- 
tional law rule invoked by plaintiffs is 
categorized as "self-executing."- The 
government insists that no cause for 
action arises from relevant interna- 
tional law. One controversial issue in 
the Nanking Massacre case is the direct 
applicability of Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention of 1907 on Land Warfare. 
Attorneys representing the victims ea- 
gerly sought legal assistance from 
abroad and obtained three expert 
opinions from reputed professors of in- 
humanitarian law-Frits 
of the Netherlands, 
Christopwr Greenwood of Britain and 
Eric Davip of Belgium-all claiming 
that the a ticle is intended to give an 
individu victim the right to seekmon- 
etary .+. I agree. TIW 
nary me ing of the words employed, 
its prepa tory work and the subse- 
quent prahtice, all suggest that Article 3 
is of such $ nature. In addition, what I 
emphasized as an expert 
law in the To- 
kyo Distrkt Court in July 1998, is that 
Japan's Cmstitution urges the judici- 
ary to play an active role to avoid Japan 
trarnplin~ on international obligations 
(Abe 199ff,260-91). 
Conte+porary Japan is a continua- 
tion of prkwar Imperial Japan. There 
have beedno serious endeavours made 
record straight like what 
and South Africa. 
War crirrlinals have been at large in 
mainstrebm society, having been 
granted &tional honours as well as sig- 
nificant ykarly pensions. The "past" is 
not yet pqssed in various sectors of the 
society, qluding the bureaucracy, leg- 
islature, hedical circles, and more im- 
portantlylkhe judiciary. Admitting legal 
responsiyilities for war-time deeds in- 
evitably 4akes the very foundations of 
theestabl/lshrnent. Its impact is tremen- 
dous. Th+ is why I feel like restraining 
myself frqm drawing an optimistic pic- 
ture regatding the outcome of the war 
reparation suits. 
New Fralatiers 
Special cj$rcumstances covering war 
reparatiw issues aside, one wonders 
why the lapanese judiciary is so cau- 
tious abopt international human rights 
law. 01-14 simple answer is that the 
judges d/p not know much about it. 
is a strong institutional 
uncertainties. There 
less tolerance inside the 
judiciary for a "brave" judge jumping 
into a ye/k unknown body of interna- 
rights law. In Japan, the 
has been systemati- 
change. Ina"har- 
society, there was little 
dissidents;deviance was 
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seen as threatening. An atmdsphere of 
empiricism never prevailed (see van 
Reenen 1997,483-91). Judges we super- 
elites of such a "conservativ " society. 
Evennow, whencitizens are etting rid f of institutionally-imposed ,cultural" 
behaviours, the socially-segqgated ju- 
diciary seems to be faithful in paintah- 
ing the status quo. Their coa/servative 
attitude is further reinforcedkjy alack of 
knowledge about internatio a1 human 
rights law which is in the f efront of 
social change. 
d, 
One more important facto is theun- 
'T 
welcome "isolation" of the Japanese 
judiciary. To put it bluntly, th judiciary 1 is toomuch"inward looking. Least felt 
in their judgments is the ser#e that Ja- 
pan is part of the internation+ cornmu- 
nity and that national law Sihould be 
resonant with international 4andards. 
The Supreme Court, or to be ore spe- 
cific its General Secretariat, d" ominates 
the entire judicial institution by wield- 
ing power to decide the prowtion and 
allocation of judges. There i$ no ques- 
tioning of it as there is no high+ author- 
ity to supervise the ~enera l  qcretariat. 
One suggestion to redirect t$is overly 
inward-looking tendency is tq secure an 
institutional mechanism to rtview the 
Supreme Court's rulings. That opportu- 
nity will come with the ratificq 'on of the P First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
Japan has not yet accepted y treaty- 
based procedures to handle $dividual 
petitions. No one can sub it to the 
Human Rights Committee a claim 
against the Japanese government 
alleging violations of humw rights 
under the first Optional Protqcol to the 
ICCPR, which is yet to be ra fied. The 
Racial Convention's similar 2 rocedure 
has not been accepted by the govern- 
ment. The ratification of th# Torture 
Convention is soon to be reauzed with 
no commitment to its indivi ual com- I plaint procedure. Various rea$ons have 
been presented to justify the govern- 
ment's inaction. Interestina(ly, there 
once was an argument that thewestern- 
invented, rights-based, quali-judicial 
system may not fit Asians 4ho natu- 
rally prefer non-judicial, cohciliatory 
types of conflict managem&. No hu- 
man rights defenders agree. It looks like 
the government has thrown away this 
manifest "subterfuge." 
Currently, the government pro- 
pounds two arguments for its inaction. 
One is the risk that the procedure willbe 
abused. What the government tries to 
protect by this argument is not the integ- 
rity of the international procedure, but 
the interests of the national judiciary. 
During a seminar on the first Optional 
Protocol organized inTokyo in summer 
of 1997, a director of the Human Rights 
and Refugee Division of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs revealed that his divi- 
sion was concerned about the flawed 
practice of the Human Rights Commit- 
tee in handling individual commu- 
nications. We were told that his team 
came up with "precedents" in which 
individual communications were in- 
correctly found admissible despitenon- 
exhaustion of local remedies. If a 
communication is inappropriately 
processed in the Committee in contra- 
vention of its procedural rules while 
still pending before national courts, it 
would inevitably impair the fair admin- 
istration of justice. This logic is directly 
related to the second argument, which 
says that the international petition pro- 
cedure may threaten the independence 
of the judiciary, an argument never 
heard of in any one of the State parties to 
the first Optional Protocol. So idiosyn- 
cratic and hairsplitting, I am afraid the 
govemment's arguments may sooner or 
later get trapped in a blind alley. 
Clearly the government's arguments 
are subterfuge. There is no reasonable 
ground in government's argument 
against the individual petition regime. 
Equally clear is the government's appre- 
hension of possible impacts upon the 
judiciary which has been secluded from 
international trends. Yet one should 
know that the protection of human 
rights in Japan willneverbe institution- 
ally complete without an assurance that 
final rulings of the high-handed, "in- 
ward-looking" top court are subject to 
internationalscrutiny. It doesnot matter 
that the "view" of the Human Rights 
Committee lacks formal binding force. 
What counts is an institutional assur- 
ance for international scrutiny. It will 
surely motivate judges to redirect their 
thinking to the abundant international 
standards as were witnessed, though 
limitedly, in such countries as Australia 
and New Zealand (Mason 1997,13). 
Strong voices are increasingly heard 
in the society calling for ratification of 
the first Optional Protocol. Virtually all 
concerned NGOs, including the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations, Am- 
nesty International, the Japan Civil Lib- 
erties Union, and academics joining the 
Association of International Human 
Rights Law, are pushing the hesitant 
government to take action. International 
pressure to encourage policy changes is 
constantly coming from the W human 
rights machineries and various human 
rights treaty bodies. Thus, it seems al- 
most inevitable for the government to 
recognize that the first Optional Proto- 
col is in existence not to shield elites' 
interests but to protect the dignity of in- 
dividual citizens. No one can precisely 
predict when, but this is surely going to 
happen. Only then can we expect a truly 
dynamic and meaningfulnormative in- 
terplay between national and interna- 
tional human rights law in Japan. 
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